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With the advent of online networks, societies are substantially more connected with individual
members able to easily modify and maintain their own social links. Here, we show that active
network maintenance exposes agents to confirmation bias, the tendency to confirm one’s beliefs, and
we explore how this affects collective opinion formation. We introduce a model of binary opinion
dynamics on a complex network with fast, stochastic rewiring and show that confirmation bias
induces a segregation of individuals with different opinions. We use the dynamics of global opinion
to generally categorize opinion update rules and find that confirmation bias always stabilizes the
consensus state. Finally, we show that the time to reach consensus has a non-monotonic dependence
on the magnitude of the bias, suggesting a novel avenue for large-scale opinion engineering.
A society is molded by the opinions of its members
and with enough time pervasive opinions become the
basis of customs and culture. However even the most
deeply-rooted ideas can be challenged and occasionally,
even rapidly, dethroned such as occurred recently with
the attitudes towards gay marriage in the US [1]. On
the other hand, fragmented, polarized opinions can and
do persist so that whether and how a belief emerges as a
social norm is a fundamental and important question [2].
While consensus is a collective state, the existence and
dynamics of this state depends on how individuals re-
ceive, process and respond to information, all of which
are influenced by cognitive bias, i.e., systematic errors in
subjective judgements [3]. Among various cognitive bi-
ases, ‘confirmation bias’ – the tendency to confirm one’s
beliefs [4] – is not only particularly relevant to opinion
formation but also sensitive to new communication tech-
nology [5–9]. In online social networks, for example, it
only takes seconds to silence disagreeing views or to seek
out new like-minded contacts. Indeed, the increasing
ability to fashion and maintain our own social circles re-
gardless of geographic proximity amplifies the effects of
a general preference for agreeing information sources, a
confirmation bias which is known as ‘selective exposure’
[6–8, 10]. Individuals are additionally subject to ‘biased
interpretation’ [11, 12], the inclination to discount in-
formation undermining one’s views. Understanding how
these and other cognitive biases affect collective opinion
formation is likely to be increasingly important to under-
standing social discourse in modern societies.
Here, we explore how confirmation bias can effect the
formation, stability and dynamics of the consensus state.
For discrete opinions, the quantitative analysis of consen-
sus dynamics can be traced to various kinetic Ising mod-
els [13–20], including the pioneering work of the voter
model [21, 22] which is exactly solvable in all dimen-
sions. The hallmarks of the voter model include (see,
e.g., Ref. [23]): inevitability of consensus; probabilistic
conservation of average opinion; and how dimensionality
d qualitatively affects the time to consensus: TC ∼ N2
for d = 1, N lnN for d = 2 and N for d > 2 with N de-
noting the system size. Latter analyses have considered
social-network-inspired refinements, including complex,
more natural network topologies [18, 19, 24–26] (see, e.g.,
Ref. [20] for a review) and, more recently, the beginning
of a fully dynamical approach [27–31].
In distinction to imposing and refining static network
structures, we endow the links with dynamics so that
collective opinions and the changing social network in
which they sit both emerge and coevolve. Agents update
their opinion based on their neighbors and links form and
disappear with differing dynamics depending on whether
they connect agreeing or disagreeing agents. We find that
confirmation bias in the form of asymmetric link dynam-
ics leads naturally to opinion segregation. In the limit
of large bias, we show that opinion polarization is unsta-
ble and consensus is stable and this result is universal
within a general family of update rules. We further show
that although strong bias in general increases consensus
time, weaker bias could speed up consensus formation,
a surprising result with implications for active network
engineering. Finally we discuss the implications of our
results for various social systems.
We introduce a model of opinion dynamics to encom-
pass both bias and opinion changes [Fig. 1]. Here, as
in previous approaches [18, 19, 30, 31], agents are repre-
sented as nodes and carry a binary opinion ↑ (σ = 1) or
↓ (σ = −1). The network, however, isn’t static [27–31].
Instead, links disappear randomly so that connections
between agents with the same opinion (agreeing links)
decay at a rate δ+ while those between opposite opin-
ions (disagreeing links) decay at a faster rate δ− > δ+
[Fig. 1(a)]. This difference in rates encodes the social
forces that push individuals towards agreement and away
from cognitive conflict [33, 34]. As disagreeing links are
shorter lived, islands of agreement form spontaneously
around each agent and these islands are the manifesta-
tion of confirmation bias. Finally, we allow for spon-
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FIG. 1. We model confirmation bias in collective opinion
formation as heterogenous link dynamics coupled with opin-
ion updates on a complex network. Top – Example Opinion
Network: Segregation is evident in a network of political we-
blogs (data from [32]), labelled according to their inclinations:
liberal (empty circles) or conservative (filled circles).a Bot-
tom – Model: (a) All links have a finite lifetime. Agreeing
links (green) connect like-minded agents and decay at a rate
δ+ while disagreeing links (red) decay at a rate δ− > δ+.
(b) New links are formed at a rate µ. (c) ‘Spineless’ agents
discard their current opinions at a rate ν and immediately
adopt ↑ opinion with a probability p, determined purely by
the opinions of their nearest neighbors. Opinion updating and
rewiring are intricately coupled; the local network structure,
governed by rewiring dynamics, dictates opinion updating and
opinion configurations determines the decay rates in rewiring
dynamics.
a To represent only the most active blogs, we remove nodes of
degree one until the minimum degree is two.
taneous new connections between any two unconnected
nodes and this occurs with rate µ [Fig. 1(b)] which we
choose proportional to 1/N to maintain a constant mean
degree across different network sizes.
All agents reevaluate their current opinions at a rate
ν after which they adopt an ↑ opinion with probability
p [Fig. 1(c)]. We consider only ‘spineless’ agents – those
whose opinion is determined purely by the opinions of
their neighbors. We will return to more complex decision
rules such as Bayesian updating (see, e.g., Refs. [2, 35]) in
the discussion. In distinction to previous work on opinion
networks (though see [36–38] on Ising systems), we char-
acterize the update probability p through a generalized
family of functions so that commonly analyzed update
processes such as ‘majority rule’ and ‘proportional rule ’
appear as limiting cases. We note that the sculpting of
the network through the dynamics of confirmation bias
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FIG. 2. Confirmation bias sculpts local social circles and in-
duces segregation of opinions. As seen by a reference agent
with ↑ opinion, we show local opinion as a function of global
opinion for biased (η > 1, solid) and unbiased (η = 1, dashed)
network dynamics. Snapshots depict exemplar networks and
illustrate that unbiased systems (disks) are well-mixed while
biased systems (squares) are segregated. The local opinion xσ
is the average opinion of neighbors [Eq. (3)] and the global
opinion m is the average opinion of all agents [Eq. (4)].
detailed above means that the composition of neighbor-
hoods at the time of opinion reevaluation depends on
the previous opinion; agents deposit their memory in the
network structure and are effectively less spineless than
those in a static network.
Real social networks are becoming larger and more
connected as links are easy to create and maintain. Face-
book, for example, currently consists of over a billion
users, each with an average of hundreds of friends [39].
Thus we consider our model in the limits of large popula-
tion and average degree 1  k¯  N where a mean-field
approximation is accurate. Online networks also greatly
facilitate link maintenance so that it is relatively easy to
acquire new neighbors and silence existing ones. Here we
assume that network rewiring is much faster than and
therefore decoupled from opinion updating: between two
opinion updates, there is always enough time for the net-
work to reach ‘equilibrium wiring’.
The wiring is encoded in the adjacency matrix A so
that Aij = 1 if there exists a link between agents i and
j and Aij = 0 otherwise. Given a static opinion configu-
ration, the master equation for A is given by
P˙ (Aij = 1) = −δijP (Aij = 1) + µP (Aij = 0), (1)
where δij = δ± for σiσj = ±1. This yields a solution
P (Aij = 1) ≈ µ/δij + Ce−δijt, (2)
where we have taken the limit N → ∞ and C is the
constant of integration. The transient dynamics defines
the adiabatic approximation so that opinion updating is
slow if min δ±  ν. In equilibrium, the probability that
3a link between agreeing and disagreeing agents exists is
P+ = µ/δ+ and P− = µ/δ−, respectively. Note that al-
though the equilibrium wiring does not contain explicit
time dependence, it is determined by the opinion config-
uration which does evolve (slowly) in time.
The mean numbers of agreeing and disagreeing links
around a σ-agent (an agent with opinion σ) are given by
(Nσ − 1)P+ and N−σP−, respectively. In the mean field
approximation, the average neighbor opinion around this
agent is given by
xσ ≈ σNσP+ −N−σP−
NσP+ +N−σP−
= σ
(σ +m)η − (σ −m)
(σ +m)η + (σ −m) (3)
where the global opinion m and the parameterisation of
confirmation bias η are defined as follows
m ≡ N↑ −N↓
N↑ +N↓
and η ≡ P+
P−
. (4)
The system is biased, exhibiting confirmation bias, if η >
1 and unbiased if η = 1. Our model also allows for anti-
confirmation bias (η < 1) but no strong evidence exists
for such an anti-social behavior on large networks and we
omit this case in the following analysis.
In Figure 2 we show how asymmetric link dynamics
(which underlie confirmation bias in our model) affects
network structure and local opinion. When η = 1, the
system is well-mixed and the local and global opinions are
equal, xσ = m. For η > 1, on the other hand, agents of
differing opinions segregate as each forms a more agree-
able neighborhood, x↓ ≤ m ≤ x↑.
Spineless agents possess neither intrinsic beliefs nor
memories so that their update rules depend entirely on
local opinions; the probability of adopting ↑ opinion is
given by pσ = p(xσ) for an agent whose previous opinion
is σ. Spinelessness also implies invariance under opinion
exchange, ↑↔↓, thus p(−x) = 1−p(x). Once there is con-
sensus among neighbors, spineless agents always adopt
the consensus opinion hence p(−1) = 0 and p(1) = 1. In
Fig. 3(a) we illustrate a variety of update rules, including
the common examples of majority and proportional rule
and we show later that these rules can be simply classified
based on the overall network dynamics. In all cases, we
further assume that agents are conforming so that they
adopt an opinion with a probability that increases with
the local fraction of that opinion, p′(x) ≥ 0.
Collective opinion states emerge as fixed points of the
global dynamics,
m˙ = −(1 +m)(1− p(x↑)) + (1−m)p(x↓). (5)
Here m denotes the global opinion and xσ={↑,↓} the local
opinion around σ-agents. We have also set ν ≡ 1 so that
all other timescales are expressed in these units. The
first term arises from ↑-to-↓ conversions and the other
describes ↓-to-↑ conversions. We note that the dynamics
is invariant under opinion exchange, p(xσ)→ 1− p(x−σ)
0
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FIG. 3. Opinion update rules can be generally classified based
on global opinion dynamics in unbiased systems. (a) The
probability of adopting ↑ opinion [see Fig. 1(c)]. Given the
constraints of spinelessness (solid disks), conformity (p′(x) ≥
0) and a mild assumption of a single inflection point, all up-
date rules can be classified as type-I (blue) or type-II (red),
based on the resulting dynamics (see panel below). Also
shown are the well-known special cases of our classification.
The majority rule (dashed) is the extreme limit of type-I rules
while the proportion rule (dash dotted) – also known as the
voter model – is at the interface between the two types of
rules. (b) Dynamical phase space in unbiased systems for
the same update rules as in (a). Consensus is stable for type-
I rules and unstable for type-II rules. For the proportion rule,
the system is completely static and fluctuations are important
in finite systems.
and m → −m, as required by spinelessness. Two fixed
points are always present. They correspond to consensus,
where m∗ = ±1 and x∗σ = ±1, and the polarized state,
where m∗ = 0 and, owing to spinelessness, x∗↑ = −x∗↓.
The asterisks denote local and global opinions at the cor-
responding fixed points. In general, the behavior of the
dynamics is determined by the nature (e.g., attractive or
repulsive) of these fixed points.
The stability of each fixed point depends on both
the opinion update rules and the severity of confirma-
tion bias. To separate the role of the update rules, we
first focus on the unbiased cases (η = 1). Here we
find, under the mild assumption of a single inflection
point, that all update rules can be classified as type-I
or type-II [Fig. 3(a)], depending on the resulting dynam-
ics [Fig. 3(b)]. Concave when x > 0, type-I rules drive
the systems to consensus, m = ±1. Convex when x > 0,
type-II rules favor the polarised state, m = 0. Neither
concave or convex, the interface between the two classes
of rules corresponds to the proportion rule, also known
as the voter model [21, 22]. This special case leads to
completely static systems in our mean field approxima-
tion. The majority rule or zero-temperature Glauber ki-
netics [40], in which agents always join the majority in
4their neighborhoods, is an extreme limit of type-I.
For the biased dynamics (η > 1), we find that strong
confirmation bias stabilizes consensus and destabilizes
opinion polarization and this result is true regardless of
the update rules. To see how bias stabilizes consensus,
we consider a one-agent perturbation from consensus.
The minority agent is always surrounded by majority
agents and the minority-to-majority conversion rate is
thus fixed, regardless of bias. As biased majority agents
discount the presence of the minority, the majority-to-
minority conversion rate approaches zero; hence, consen-
sus is stable. More precisely, near the consensus fixed
point, we have
dm˙
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=1
= −1 + 2p′(1)f ′(1), (6)
where xσ ≡ σf(σm) describes the relation between local
and global opinions. In general, confirmation bias implies
f ′(1) ≤ 1 (see also Fig. 2) and, with strong bias, small
minority fraction will not change local opinions around
majority-agents, i.e., f ′(1)→ 0 as η →∞. Consequently
dm˙/dm|m=1 → −1 from above (since we always have
p′(1) ≥ 0), i.e., consensus stability increases with bias.
To understand the dynamics near the polarized state,
we recall that in general f(m) is given by Eq. (3). In the
limit η  1, this yields
dm˙
dm
∣∣∣∣
m=0
η1≈ p′(1)4
η
+O
(
1
η2
)
. (7)
That is, opinion polarization is always unstable in this
limit since p′(1) ≥ 0. We see that, near both fixed points,
strong bias leads to universal dynamics, i.e., the nature
of the fixed points is independent of the opinion update
rules. This is particularly useful given few empirical re-
sults for the precise details of the rules employed by real
agents [41]. The speed of the dynamics near the polar-
ized state does depend on the form of update rules and
we consider the consensus time TC =
∫ 1
0
(m˙)−1dm, the
time taken by the system to reach consensus from the
polarized state. In quenched Ising systems this quantity
is known as the saturation time. To circumvent the di-
vergences at the fixed points (where m˙ = 0), we note
that the global opinion evolves in a step of 2/N in a fi-
nite system and alter the integration limits accordingly,
TC ∼ limN→∞
∫ 1−2b/N
2a/N
dm
m˙ . Here a and b denote small
positive integers which represent the first and final few
steps where the mean field picture breaks down and the
microscopic (stochastic) details are important. Factoring
out the logarithmic divergence, we have
TC
lnN
∼
(
dm
dm˙
)
m=0
+
(
−dm
dm˙
)
m=1
. (8)
This result holds if and only if there is no fixed point
at an intermediate global opinion and both terms on the
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FIG. 4. The time to consensus depends strongly on both
opinion update rules and confirmation bias. (a) The con-
sensus time TC for majority-rule systems (dashed) increases
with bias η whereas for for proportion-rule systems (solid),
TC clearly shows non-monotonic dependence. (b) Family of
opinion update rules pα(x) (exact form in the text) so that
rules with α > 0 type-I and those with α < 0 are type-II.
The proportion and majority rules correspond to α = 0 and
α = ∞, respectively. (c) For all rules, there exists a mini-
mum in TC at some η > 1 marked by the white curve. For
type-II rules (α < 0), we observe three regions (in the order
of increasing bias): where the polarised state is the only at-
tractive fixed point (grey shading); where consensus is also
attractive (red shading); and where consensus prevail as the
only attractive fixed point (colour scale). The minimum in
TC exists in the final region.
r.h.s. are positive. Physically the first term measures
depolarizing time and the second consensus approach-
ing time. From Eq. (6), we see that the consensus ap-
proaching time decreases and saturates as bias becomes
stronger. In contrast we see from Eq. (7) that the depo-
larising time goes as η for η  1. Therefor TC ∼ η for
η  1.
In Fig. 4(a), we sketch the time to consensus in our
model for the two well-known update rules: the majority
rule and the proportion rule (voter model). Remarkably,
for the proportion rule, TC develops a minimum at an in-
termediate bias, η > 1 and this suggests that there could
be an optimal bias for fast consensus formation. Such
non-monotonic behavior is absent with the majority rule
where TC simply increases with η. To systematically ex-
plore a family of update rules, we adopt a functional pa-
rameterization pα(x) =
1
2 +
1
pi tan
−1(eα tan xpi2 ) as shown
in Fig. 4(b) so that pα(x) is type-I if α > 0 and type-II
if α < 0. The proportion rule corresponds to α = 0 and
5the majority rule to α =∞.
Figure 4(c) illustrates how TC depends on both the
update rules α and the bias η. For type-II rules (α < 0)
and η = 1 (no bias), the polarized state m = 0 is the only
attractive fixed point (grey shading). As η increases, first
the consensus state is stabilized (red shading) and then
the polarized state is destabilized (color scale) and the
system flows uninterrupted from m = 0 to m = ±1 with
TC given by Eq. (8). The minimum of TC shown pre-
viously for the proportion rule is now seen to be quite
general for all rules. The initial decrease in TC results
from disproportionate decreases in forward (minority-to-
majority) and backward (majority-to-minority) conver-
sions. Though all agents find themselves in neighbor-
hoods of agreement, majority agents form more agree-
ing neighborhoods since it is easier to find like-minded
agents. In consequence although the rate of both for-
ward and backward conversions decrease with increasing
bias, backward conversions decrease more than forward
conversions; hence, the speed up of consensus formation.
The increase in TC at larger η results from the fact that
the likelihood of a backward conversion cannot drop be-
low zero but backward conversions continue to decrease;
therefore, fewer net conversions and longer TC .
To further elucidate the impact of bias in our opin-
ion model, we consider an extreme case where a fair coin
toss decides the outcome of each opinion update, i.e.,
p(x) = 1/2. In this case, the majority opinion suffers net
outward conversions since inbound conversions originate
from a smaller population and thus are less frequent than
outward conversions. Hence, equal mixing of opinions is
stable. Social interactions, as encapsulated in opinion
update rules, can however change this picture. The pro-
portion rule, for example, suppresses the probability of a
majority-to-minority conversion and enhances the reverse
in such a balanced way that each opinion population does
not grow or shrink regardless of the global opinion. The
majority rule reinforces this effect even further and, as a
result, the only conversions left in the system are from
minority to majority.
When subject to bias, individuals now form a distorted
worldview as they embed themselves among kindred spir-
its. Agents in the majority overestimate their majority
and consequently rarely switch sides. Similarly, those in
the minority are less likely to switch but their social cir-
cles are also less likely to be homogeneous, meaning con-
versions to the majority, though less frequent with bias,
are still present. In short, intermediate confirmation bias
can result in an increase in net conversions from minor-
ity to majority, hence speeding up agreement formation,
but strong bias deprives the system of any conversions,
resulting in longer consensus time.
A number of generalizations of our model are immedi-
ately apparent. When consensus is stable, as for strong
bias, a small perturbation in global opinion cannot lead
to a permanent global opinion shift, a result at odds with
how new, sparely known ideas can supersede old beliefs
and become common knowledge. In our model, a natural
way to capture this phenomenon is to break opinion sym-
metry, making one opinion more stable than the other,
as with Ising spins in an external field. Such an asymme-
try may also capture other social spreading phenomena
such as the propagation of rumors or diseases (see, e.g.,
Ref. [24]).
The choice of update rules poses an important chal-
lenge to opinion dynamics modeling, particularly in the
absence of strong empirical constraints. One approach is
to rationalize agents so that their update dynamics are a
result of individual optimizations, such as fastest consen-
sus formation or longest time with the opinion on which
the society reaches consensus. With clear individual ob-
jectives, each received signal is carefully interpreted and
optimal strategy deduced. It would be very interesting
to see whether heuristic opinion update rules, such as
in our work, could emerge in a system of rational indi-
viduals performing sophisticated calculations, e.g., using
Bayesian inference (see, Ref. [2] for a review).
Insights into social dynamics could also allow large-
scale opinion engineering. Indeed, the idea that collective
beliefs can be manipulated is not new; for example, see
Ref. [42] where it was empirically shown that the arrival
of The Fox News affected the Republican vote share. As
an illustration, our results suggest that the speed of col-
lective opinion formation could be controlled if one can
tune individual dynamics. In online social networks such
as Facebook, algorithms exist such that interactions de-
termine information flows between two users; hence, am-
plifying confirmation bias. Certainly a reverse algorithm
could be engineered and this could have important im-
plications for mass opinion manipulations. For example,
an authoritarian regime might want to slow down collec-
tive opinion formation to allow more time to steer the
dynamics in the preferred direction before speeding up
consensus formation.
Social regularities, such as common culture or lan-
guages, and their spontaneous emergence, show similari-
ties to collective behavior in physical systems, thus rais-
ing the hope that some social phenomena could be under-
stood in the context of models and concepts from statis-
tical physics. Just as magnetism rests on the microscopic
dynamics of spin, collective social phenomena arises from
human behaviors. While we have focused here on con-
firmation bias, increasingly quantitative approaches in
behavioral sciences are offer important new ingredients
to understanding collective social phenomena. By incor-
porating such laws in simple model systems, we expect
further advances in the physics of social networks.
This work was supported in part by funding from the
Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology Graduate
University.
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